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Company Taxes in the European





In 1992, the Ruding Committee, appointed by the European Commission to
examine the need for company tax (CT) harmonisation in the European Union
(EU), presented its findings and recommendations.
2 Although the Committee
concluded that differences in CTs distort the workings of the internal market —
differences which most likely would not be eliminated by market forces or tax
competition — it none the less proposed to leave the CTs in the EU essentially
the same as it had found them, replete with their widely diverging domestic and
cross-border treatment of different kinds of returns and different kinds of
recipients of the various returns. As argued below, however, differential
treatment will perpetuate the distortions inherent to the current CTs and erode
the taxing authority of source states. A minimum statutory CT rate of 30 per
cent, proposed by the Ruding Committee, and the adoption of the (draft)
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directives of the European Commission
3 are insufficient to repair the
infringements of the neutrality and subsidiarity requirements, as applied to
taxation, agreed to by the member states. More fundamental
reform seems called for. Moreover, CT reform in the member states is a
condition for CT co-ordination between the member states.
This article reviews the distortions and the tax-base erosion of the current
CTs in the EU and examines various options for reform and co-ordination. The
article falls into five sections. Following this introduction, Section II briefly
reviews current CTs, distinguishing their treatment of the returns on equity
(profits) from their treatment of the returns on debt (interest). The review shows
that reform is called for if member states wish to continue taxing company
earnings (and other capital income) in an even-handed manner. As explained in
Section III, reforms should be guided by the neutrality criterion and the
subsidiarity requirement (i.e. member state tax autonomy), as laid down in the
treaties establishing the single internal market. Subsequently, Section IV
examines various alternatives to the current arrangements. These alternatives are
full integration, dual imputation, dividend deduction, an allowance for corporate
equity, a cash-flow tax, a comprehensive business income tax and the dual
income tax. Section V explores the preferred alternative.
At the outset, it should be emphasised that the article focuses on desirable CT
reform in a world of increasing capital mobility. Attempts to maintain global,
residence-based, income taxes in a world of increasing capital mobility have
resulted in complex, fragmentary and largely ineffective levies on company
profits (and other capital income) that violate horizontal and vertical equity
norms, as well as competitive conditions. It will be argued that across-the-board
source taxation of all capital income at low proportional rates is most likely to
ensure a greater degree of effective equity, as well as yield neutrality gains
compared with the current situation by eliminating the tax discrimination of
different types of investment and methods of financing. Specifically, company
earnings on equity and on debt should be subjected to identical tax treatments.
Co-ordination is essential for the survival of the CT. Agreement on the CT
entitlement rules — who should tax, where and what — is a prerequisite for
maintaining operational independence in implementing the tax.
 II. REVIEW OF CURRENT COMPANY TAXES
The 15 member states of the EU tax different kinds of returns (retained profits,
dividends, capital gains, interest, royalties) and different kinds of recipients of
these returns (tax-liable residents, non-residents, exempt entities; companies,
individuals) at widely diverging effective rates of tax. This is a source of
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distortion, discrimination and socially unproductive tax arbitrage.
4 These issues
are dealt with below, following a brief survey of current CTs.
Survey of Company Taxes
Company taxes in the EU (and elsewhere) are commonly distinguished
depending on whether and to what extent they reduce the double tax — CT and
personal income tax (PT) — on distributed profits, i.e. provide dividend relief.
5
As shown in Table 1, basically four approaches are being used.
•   Six member states employ the imputation system, including the largest states:
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
6Under the imputation
system, shareholders are permitted a full or partial tax credit against their PT
for the CT that can be imputed to the dividends received by them. (Finland
provides full relief; other member states offer less than full relief.) Two
distinguishing features of imputation systems are (a) the gross-up of the net
dividend by the tax credit (which is usually expressed as a fraction of the net
dividend) and (b) the imposition of CT on exempt profits that are used to pay
dividends (compensatory tax).
•   Two member states use the tax credit method which, in contrast to the
imputation system, either does not have the gross-up feature (Portugal) or
permits the tax credit without ensuring that the underlying CT has been paid
(Spain) — in other words, without levying a compensatory tax.
•   Six member states provide dividend relief at shareholder level by taxing
dividend income at a special, usually flat, PT rate. Since Greece exempts
dividend income in the hands of shareholders, its special PT rate may be said
to be zero. Luxemburg exempts half of dividends received; dividend income,
in other words, is taxed at half of marginal PT rates.
•   One member state, the Netherlands, regards companies as entities entirely
separate from their shareholders and taxes them as such under what is called
the classical system. Apart from a small exemption at shareholder level,
dividend income is fully subject to the twin yoke of the CT and the PT.
Thus 14 out of 15 member states provide dividend relief at shareholder level.
The imputation system is the most structured form of relief, because it reduces
the double CT/PT burden on profit distributions in proportion to the marginal PT
rates of all shareholders. In contrast, under the tax credit method without gross-
up and the special PT rate schemes, the relief tends to be greater for high income
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bracket PT-payers than for low income bracket PT-payers. This regressive effect
can be mitigated (as is done in Austria and Belgium) but not eliminated, by
permitting low income bracket PT-payers, whose marginal ordinary PT rate is
lower than the special PT rate, to opt for classical double taxation of their
dividend income (with credit for the special PT withheld at source).
Furthermore, more than full relief can be provided under the special PT rate
schemes as well as the tax credit method, if dividends are paid out of exempt
profits.
7
2. Taxing Returns on Equity: Distortion and Discrimination
Finland and Greece are the only member states that tax profit distributions and
retentions at the same marginal CT/PT rates. In all other member states, the
CT+PT on distributions is generally higher than the CT on retentions.
8 In
comparing the effective tax rates, the PT on capital gains should be taken into
account, of course. Generally, however, effective rates are (very) low or nil (see
Table 1). Seven member states do not tax capital gains on ordinary shares. Other
member states tax capital gains but only upon realisation: a concession,
equivalent in value to an interest-free loan. Gains on the sale of shares that
represent a substantial holding, i.e. a controlling interest, are taxed more widely
but, again, deferral and preferential rates should result in relatively low tax
burdens.
If, as appears to be the case, the CT+PT on profit distributions is higher than
the CT (plus capital gains tax, if any) on retained profits, then dividend payout
decisions will be distorted and new investment will be discouraged. At least, this
should be the case under the ‘traditional view’, which holds that dividend
payouts cannot be lowered without cost because they offer non-tax benefits, for
instance by signalling shareholders that the company is financially healthy or by
limiting financial discretion and hence potential misuse of funds by
management.
9 Under the `new view’, on the other hand, the double tax does not
affect dividend payout decisions or the effective rate of tax on investments
financed by retentions, because the PT on dividend income ‘trapped’ in the
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company acts as a once-off wealth tax.
10 Most empirical studies support the
traditional view over the new view (Poterba, 1987; Gerardi, Graetz and Rosen,
1990; Zodrow, 1991). Whatever view is adopted, taxing dividends twice always
harms investments by new and emerging firms, which have to rely on new share
issues to provide for their equity needs.
The distortions described above yield important EU-wide implications. First,
the higher tax on dividends, which stimulates profit retention, reduces the
amount of capital becoming available on European capital markets and thus
hampers the development of EU share markets. Second, investments by old firms
financed through retained earnings tend to yield a lower (before-tax) return than
can be obtained elsewhere. In other words, resources are misallocated. Third, the
tax bias in favour of old firms inhibits the entry of new firms, i.e. the tax system
infringes on competitive conditions, thereby jeopardising the dynamics of the
single internal market. In addition, current CT/PT systems have differential inter-
member-state effects. The high tax on distributed profits, for instance,
discriminates in favour of member states with many mature firms (which do not
need new equity). Also, it confers an artificial advantage on member states with
companies that conform to the ‘conduit’ model of the firm (with shareholders
managing the company) and that, therefore, do not need to distribute a large
portion of their profits to satisfy shareholders.
Last but not least, the discrimination between mature companies (able to rely
on profit retention to finance investments) and new, emerging companies (having
to rely on new share issues) closely echoes the tax discrimination between the
company form and the non-company form of doing business.
11 Under a CT with
less than full imputation, the total tax on the equity income of new firms (having
to distribute all profits), for which the company form is a conditio sine qua non,
would generally be higher than the PT on the business income of the self-
employed. Conversely, the CT (plus capital gains tax, if any) on the retained
profits of mature companies would generally be lower than the PT on the
business income of the self-employed, who cannot incorporate their businesses.
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Under financial neutrality, the CT+PT on the equity income of all companies,
regardless of maturity, of course, should equal the PT on the business income of
the self-employed.
3. Taxing Returns on Debt: the Hole in the CT Bucket
As Table 1 indicates, interest appears to be taxed positively, although
generally at lower rates than the CT+PT on profit distributions. In reality,
however, most interest is not taxed at all due to the symbiosis between interest
deductibility at company (and personal) level and the existence of capital-rich
tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds, life insurance companies and social
security funds. Typically, interest income accruing to these institutional
investors is not taxed, in contrast to returns on equity, which are taxed at
source.
12
The effective exemption of much interest has greatly stimulated debt finance
(thin capitalisation) and eroded the capital income tax base in most member
states. In the Netherlands, for instance, in 1989 approximately Df 40 billion (8
per cent of GDP) of tax-deductible interest payments was ‘washed out’ by tax-
exempt investors. On a net basis, the business sector accounted for 60 per cent of
this amount (Cnossen, 1995). Furthermore, Sørensen (1988), reporting on the
Danish situation, calculated that, in 1986, tax revenue collected on personal
capital income was minus 1.6 per cent of GDP (11 per cent of total capital
income computed on the basis of national accounts). Earlier, Hansson and
Norman (quoted in Sørensen (1994a, p. 78)) estimated that the yield of the
Swedish tax on capital income was minus 0.3 per cent of household economic
income. These findings are corroborated by Gordon and Slemrod (1988), who
concluded that the complete exemption of capital income in the US in 1983
would have raised revenue.
13
The growing internationalisation and liberalisation of capital markets also
suggest that interest is hardly taxed, because these developments increase
opportunities for evading or avoiding the PT or CT on interest income. Whereas
retained earnings are taxed at source through the CT, the tax authorities cannot
be sure that cross-border interest payments are reported and taxed.
14 Moreover,
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withholding rates on cross-border interest payments (which vary by class of
payer and payee, and by type of financial instrument — by itself a source of
wasteful tax arbitrage) are very low.
15 As a result, as Huizinga (1994) concludes,
`international interest income to a large extent escapes taxation’. This favours
international debt finance, violates neutrality, skews investors’ portfolios and
results in an arbitrary division of the interest income base between lending and
borrowing countries.
The tax-favoured status of debt also discriminates against companies that face
difficulties in attracting debt, because they do not yet enjoy a high credit rating,
own mainly non-liquid assets (such as firm-specific machinery) against which it
is difficult to borrow, or generate insufficient taxable profits to be able to deduct
interest. Consequently, these companies, which tend to be fledgeling enterprises,
have to incur higher capital costs on account of taxation than do older,
established companies with either easier access to debt financing or sufficient
retained profits to finance new investments. Furthermore, at the EU level, the
preferential treatment of debt favours member states with institutions (banks and
large firms with liquid assets) that allow substantial debt finance.
16 In short, the
equality of competitive conditions is violated.
4. Conclusion
This brief survey has raised three concerns. First, in nearly every member state,
effective CT+PT rates on investment returns vary depending on the choice of
financing (equity or debt), the company’s dividend policy (distribution or
retention), the form in which the investment is undertaken (the company form or
the non-company form), the tax status of the recipient of the return (liable to the
PT and/or the CT, or exempt) and the place of residence of the recipient of the
return (at home or abroad). Broadly, as the OECD (1991) has pointed out, debt
finance is favoured and individual investors are discriminated against.
17 Also, the
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taxing arrangements raise the entry costs of new companies which provide an
important impetus to the development of entrepreneurial skills in the single
internal market.
Second, even if the CT/PT systems would achieve neutrality with respect to
different types of investment and methods of financing, they would still distort
the level of investment. By taxing the opportunity cost of capital, the CT/PT
reduces the incentive to invest, because investments that just yield a viable
economic return before tax will not be worth undertaking after tax. This is the
price that must be paid if it is considered desirable to tax investment returns.
Third, the symbiosis between interest deductibility and capital-rich tax-
exempt domestic and foreign sectors and other opportunities for tax arbitrage
erode the company (and capital) income tax base. This effect is reinforced by the
substitution of hard-to-reach international debt (interest being taxed on the
residence principle) for easier-to-tax equity (profits being taxed on the source
principle). The toothless bite of capital income taxes, of course, greatly mitigates
the distortions mentioned above, but at the expense of violating prevailing
interpersonal and interjurisdictional equity norms.
III. CRITERIA FOR REFORM AND CO-ORDINATION
The previous section indicates that reform and co-ordination
seem called for. As with other economic policy issues in the EU, the
compass should be focused on the twin lodestars: neutrality and subsidiarity.
This section examines these criteria more closely as they apply to
company taxation.
1. Neutrality and Subsidiarity
The leitmotif of the Treaty of Rome (1957) is that competition should be the
mechanism for allocating economic resources in the EU. Accordingly, tax
neutrality should be its corollary in so far as it aims at ensuring that equal
conditions for competitors are not distorted through the tax system. Neutrality
within member states is an indispensable condition for neutrality between
member states. As long as CTs distort the choice between debt and equity,
distribution and retention, the company form and the non-company form of
doing business within member states, they are bound to distort investment
decisions across the EU.
18
                                                                                                                                   
companies (of which 16 per cent responded) in the EU and the countries of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA).
18 It should be emphasised that tax neutrality, as interpreted here, abstracts from various next-best issues, such
as differences in mobility, asymmetric information, etc. For a broad treatment of the welfare economics of tax
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The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) enshrined subsidiarity as the guiding
criterion in the discussion on the assignment of policy functions in the EU. Still
evolving, subsidiarity proceeds from a presumption in favour of decentralisation.
Basically, policy functions, including taxation, should be exercised by the
member states, but the states are obliged to consider the effects of their actions
on other member states (Smith, 1993). While tax neutrality generally requires a
substantial degree of tax co-ordination, subsidiarity, in contrast, implies that
each member state should be permitted as much tax independence as is
commensurate with the goals of free trade and free competition in the single
internal market (Cnossen, 1990).
In taxation, subsidiarity seems to have two distinct but related dimensions.
First and foremost, subsidiarity implies that member states should co-operate to
establish the rules of the tax game. Basically, these rules should have regard to
the allocation of the various tax bases in the EU to individual member states in
such a way that overtaxation or undertaxation across member states is avoided.
Also, unambiguous definitions and practices, i.e. transparency, are essential.
Second, and no less important, subsidiarity means that member states should be
able to operate their own tax systems, designed in accordance with the agreed
rules, without the need for day-to-day co-operation with other member states in
the form of information exchange, cross-border audits, etc. Operational
independence has regard to legal concepts and practices, as well as assessment,
collection and appeal procedures.
19 Viewed together, these two features of
subsidiarity suggest that tax sovereignty has to be ceded in establishing the tax
entitlement rules so that tax independence can be exercised more fully in
administering these rules.
20
 2. Application to Company Taxation
Neutrality and subsidiarity are difficult to effect in the field of company taxation.
For one thing, as amply illustrated in Section II, various kinds of return (retained
profits, dividends, interest, royalties) and various kinds of recipients (tax-liable
individuals, exempt entities, out-of-state residents) have traditionally been
treated differently for tax purposes within and between member states. For
another, while company profits are mainly taxed on the source basis, the claim to
tax interest rests mainly on the residence principle. Thus company earnings are
subject to different internal tax regimes and different interstate tax entitlement
                                                                                                                                   
19 McLure (1992b) is the auctor intellectualis of the operational (or, as he calls it, administrative)
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rules. Clearly, some fundamental rethinking must be done to straighten out these
mixed sets of tax rules and practices in light of the new requirements.
Internal neutrality requires foremost that various kinds of company earnings,
with respect to equity and debt, are subjected to identical tax treatments. The
age- old distinction between debt and equity has become unrealistic and
unworkable. Discriminatory and distortionary effects are exacerbated by the
symbiosis of debt finance and capital-rich, tax-exempt sectors. Wasteful tax
arbitrage and dead- weight losses may be sizeable. Half-baked solutions, such as
prescribed debt-equity ratios, apart from bringing their own distortions along,
will not solve the problem. The solution can be found only by viewing interest as
another form of distributed company earnings.
External neutrality is even more difficult to achieve, because historically the
CT has been levied on the source principle, instead of the residence principle.
Company profits are taxed where they arise, i.e. in the source state, instead of
according to who they accrue to, i.e. in the residence state. Unlike the residence
state, however, the source state cannot ensure neutrality regarding EU-wide
investment location decisions because, other things being equal, companies will
tend to establish their profit-making activities in the state with the lowest CT
instead of the state with the lowest production costs. While the source state can
tax companies doing business on its territory alike (non-discrimination
principle), it has no say over the out-of- state tax treatment of repatriated profits.
In other words, the source state cannot equalise effective tax rates for all
participants, taking account of any additional taxes they must pay in the
residence state (capital import neutrality). Only the residence state can ensure
efficiency in the EU-wide (and world-wide) allocation of resources (capital
export neutrality).
21
Capital export neutrality (embodied by the pure residence principle), on the
other hand, is difficult to put into practice, particularly for the CT, in a single
market with total freedom of trade and factor movements and a planned
centralised monetary policy with a single currency. For one thing, source states
would have to give up their historic right to tax company profits. For another,
company profits would have to be taxed on an EU-wide basis as they accrue, and
in accordance with the profit-determination rules of the residence state.
Obviously, tax deferral, let alone tax exemption, cannot be allowed as it would
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investment, over capital import neutrality, which promotes efficiency in the allocation of savings. The reason is
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capital, i.e. savers. Hence, distortions in deviating from capital export neutrality tend to be greater.
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unless there were harmonisation. In considering these positions, note that as capital and capital owners become
increasingly more mobile in the EU, the distinction between capital export and capital import neutrality is
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imply the continuation of source taxation. Furthermore, residence states should
be able to check the accuracy, in source states, of the reporting for out-of-state
profits. All this suggests that residence-based CTs would violate the operational
independence principle, because an inordinate degree of day-to-day interstate co-
ordination (resembling the workings of a single, EU-wide CT administration)
would be required. Clearly, at this juncture, the CTs in the EU should continue
to be founded on the source entitlement principle.
22
The primacy — perhaps the expediency — of the source entitlement principle
establishes a case for exempting all inward dividend income from CT or PT and
all outward dividend income from withholding tax. In other words, residence
states should give up all claims to taxing out-of-state dividend income whether
from direct investment or portfolio shareholding in the EU. Furthermore, the
current residual right, for interpersonal equity purposes, of residence states to tax
inward dividends violates financial neutrality and operational independency.
Similarly, source states would have to renounce all claims to taxing out-of-state
shareholders with respect to dividends paid to them. Likewise, imputation tax
credits should not be extended to non-resident shareholders.
Neutrality and operational independence in taxing company equity income
can largely be undone, however, by non-neutrality and operational dependence
(i.e. the need for day-to-day co-operation) in the tax treatment of interest (and
royalties) payable to out-of-state residents. Full reliance on the residence
principle means that interest (most likely) will not be taxed, because it accrues to
tax-exempt out-of-state investors or is channelled through tax havens. Moreover,
residence taxation of interest requires substantial day-to-day co-operation,
because source states must inform residence states of outward interest payments.
This weak spot in the CT bucket can only be repaired by taxing interest on the
basis of the source principle. This is a clear breach with current practice, but an
inevitable one if interest payments on inward debt are to be taxed at all.
3. Summing Up
In sum, most practical considerations imply that the choice is not between the
source and the residence principle for taxing company profits, but between the
source principle and no tax at all. Under the source principle, however, neutrality
can be achieved only if the basic design of the various CTs is, by and large,
harmonised and if statutory rates are approximately the same. If so, operational
independence will largely be safeguarded because companies will have few
incentives to relocate their profit-making activities to other member states, or to
shift profits by manipulating their intercompany transfer prices (including
                                                                                                                                   
22 See especially Musgrave (1987), who is the most vocal academic proponent of the source entitlement
principle in allocating the CT base as a matter of inter-nation equity. For strong arguments in favour of the
source principle, see also Vogel (1990). Brean (1992) rightly points out that the precise source of income may
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overhead expenses) or their debt-equity structures. Moreover, the need for day-
to-day co-operation would be minimised.
Specifically, neutrality and subsidiarity seem to imply the following criteria
against which current CT systems and various alternatives, focusing on tax co-
ordination through tax reform, should be evaluated:
•   greater uniformity of the overall effective tax rates on the return to equity,
whether retained or distributed, and the return to debt;
•   greater uniformity of effective tax rates, regardless of whether the return of an
investment accrues to domestic or foreign investors;
•   minimisation of the potential for tax avoidance and tax evasion, as well as the
compliance and administrative costs of the CT regime; and, perhaps more
controversially,
•   allocation of the tax base for equity income as well as debt income primarily
to the member state of investment (source state) instead of the state of the
investor (residence state).
IV. OPTIONS FOR CO-ORDINATING COMPANY TAXES
Which CT would best meet the criteria spelled out above? In trying to answer
that question, this section reviews and evaluates various alternatives to the
current CTs that have been proposed in the literature or put into practice. Some
alternatives attempt to reduce or eliminate the discriminatory treatment of
various forms of company earnings by adhering more closely to the requirements
of a global, progressive income tax. Full integration, dual imputation and
dividend deduction are examples of this approach. Other options, such as an
allowance for corporate equity and a cash-flow tax, emphasise the desirability of
neutrality. Specifically, only pure profits or rent income should be taxed, not the
opportunity cost of capital. A third set of alternatives occupies the middle ground
by taxing all company earnings (retentions, distributions, interest) in full, but at
the same low, proportional CT/PT rate. The comprehensive business income tax
and the dual income tax are examples of this approach.
1. Full Integration
Proponents of the global concept of income, as formulated by Schanz, Haig and
Simons, argue that the CT should be fully integrated with the PT of
shareholders.
23 Under full integration, all company earnings (distributed as well
as retained profits, and interest) would be allocated to shareholders and
debtholders and taxed at their marginal PT rate. Because all company earnings
would be taxed alike, for new investment, the distinction between equity and
                                                                                                                                   
23 For the classical exposition of the S-H-S income concept, see Goode (1975). For the normative inference of
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debt, profit retention and distribution or the company form and the non-company
form of doing business would become irrelevant.
Full integration has been proposed by the Royal (Carter) Commission in
Canada (1966), the US Department of the Treasury (1979 — Blueprints) and the
Campbell Committee (1981) in Australia. Under both the voluntary CT- and PT-
rate alignment plan (Carter) and the mandatory partnership methods (Blueprints,
Campbell), all corporate equity income would be allocated to shareholders and
taxed in their hands with a full credit for the CT paid on their behalf. To prevent
double taxation of retentions, the basis for corporate shares would be written up
by the amount of the allocation net of the tax credit. Profit distributions would be
considered repayment of capital up to the amount of the written-up basis; further
repayments would be considered taxable capital gains.
These plans, however ingenious, have never left the drawing board, primarily
because they are considered impracticable (McLure, 1979; US Department of the
Treasury, 1992). The administrative objections relate to the precise and timely
allocation of company profits to shareholders and, perhaps even more important,
to the ascertainment of true economic income under which capital allowances
would reflect actual economic depreciation and capital gains would be taxed as
they accrued. In practice, this would require that all assets be revalued each year
to measure the real loss or gain. In the presence of inflation, moreover,
adjustments would have to be made to the real value of the outstanding debt.
24
Further complications arise when cross-border investments are taken into
consideration. Under global, fully integrated CTs, the returns on these
investments should be taxed on the basis of the residence principle — an
extremely demanding administrative requirement, as argued above.
The administrative objection to full integration also has an economic
counterpart. The economics literature has argued that, from a national point of
view, the greater mobility of capital compared with labour means that it is not
optimal to tax capital income at the same (high) rate as labour income, since this
does not take account of the greater elasticity of supply of capital compared with
labour (in terms of sensitivity to changes in the net real interest rate and the net
real wage rate, both after tax, respectively).
25 High tax rates would induce capital
flight and saddle labour with the burden in the form of lower productivity and
lower real wages. Although capital is not fully mobile, especially in its physical
form, moderation (or world-wide co-ordination) none the less seems to be
required.
                                                                                                                                   
24 For a useful treatment, see Boadway, Bruce and Mintz (1982).
25 Here, the emphasis is on physical capital. See Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and King (1980). As an
extension, it has been suggested that a small, open economy in a world of full capital mobility acts optimally by
placing the marginal tax burden exclusively on the immobile factor, labour (Razin and Sadka, 1989). It should
be pointed out, however, that these studies assume that there is no co-ordination of capital income taxes.Fiscal Studies
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2. Dual Imputation
The dual imputation system focuses especially on the effective, one-level
taxation of interest and dividend income.
26 Under this system, interest is treated
in the same fashion as dividends are under current (full) imputation systems. In
other words, interest would not be deductible at company level, but debtholders
would be permitted a tax credit for the underlying CT against their PT (or CT)
on their taxable interest income (grossed up by the tax credit). Alternatively, but
equivalently, interest could continue to be deductible in computing taxable
company profits, but it would be subjected to a withholding tax at a rate equal to
the CT rate. Eleven member states already tax interest at source, but without
regard to the comparable implications of dividend imputation systems. Exempt
entities, for instance, are entitled to a refund of interest withheld. In contrast,
under most imputation systems (Ireland and the UK are exceptions), exempt
entities do not have the right to claim refunds of unused tax credits. The same
rule should apply to interest, if equal treatment is to be ensured. To block an
obvious avoidance route, the withholding tax on non-residents would have to be
raised.
A dual imputation system would put dividend and interest on the same tax
footing, but would maintain the favourable tax treatment of retained profits. The
effective tax rate on debt-financed investment would increase, but the tax rate on
equity-financed investment (assuming statutory rates remain unchanged) would
decrease in member states that do not yet have an imputation system. There
would be few technical transition problems, but tax treaties might have to be
renegotiated to extend the tax credit to debtholders in other member states. This
would complicate the workings of the system and infringe on the operational
independence principle. The greatest drawback of a dual imputation system —
indeed, of any scheme that reduces the tax benefits to debt finance — is that the
effective taxation of interest at the lender’s CT rate or his (higher) PT rate would
reduce the post-tax return to saving or instead raise the cost of capital to a level
that could have detrimental effects on capital formation in the EU.
3. Dividend Deduction
 Greater equality in the current treatment of dividend and interest can also be
achieved by allowing a deduction for dividends paid in calculating taxable
profits. The dividend deduction system is not found in the EU, but was in use in
most Nordic countries before they switched to the imputation system.
27 Unless
                                                                                                                                   
26 The system’s name was coined by Graetz (1989). Warren (1991) came out in favour of the system in his
report to the American Law Institute.
27 Iceland still permits a dividend deduction up to an amount equal to 10 per cent of paid-in capital plus any
later issue of stock dividends. Also, the US Treasury Department Report to the President (1984) included a
proposal for a 50 per cent deduction (later reduced to 10 per cent) for dividends paid. It should be noted that aCompany Taxes in the EU
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the goal is to stimulate equity investment by non-residents, a drawback of the
dividend deduction system is that the relief is automatically extended to foreign
shareholders, who do not pay the (additional) national PT incurred by domestic
shareholders.
28 To prevent this, a dividend withholding tax could be introduced
(or increased). This would make the dividend deduction system equivalent to an
imputation system. Without a withholding complement, the dividend deduction
system would jeopardise the effective, one-level taxation of distributed profits.
Furthermore, a deduction for dividends paid on new share issues has received
strong support from proponents of the new view, particularly in the US.
29 Until
1991, Sweden also permitted a deduction for dividends paid on newly issued
shares. The total, cumulative amount could not exceed the paid-in capital, and
the concession expired 20 years after the year of issue. Furthermore, it should be
noted that Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg permit a (limited) deduction from
personal income for expenditures on the purchase of new shares, a concession
which can be viewed as an alternative to a dividend deduction scheme for new
share issues. In practice, it appears difficult to draw an effective distinction
between new equity and old equity.
4. Allowance for Corporate Equity
Full integration, dual imputation and dividend deduction all tax the opportunity
cost of capital — often referred to as `normal profits’. This implies, however,
that the level of saving and investment would continue to be distorted. If the CT
is not to interfere with the level of economic activity, only `pure profits’ or
‘economic rents’ should be taxed. The ACE system, conceived by Boadway and
Bruce (1984) but given hand and feet by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991),
purports to achieve this by providing an Allowance for Corporate Equity in
computing taxable profits, equal to the product of `shareholders’ funds’
(generally, the company’s total equity capital, including taxable profits net of
CT) and an `appropriate nominal interest rate’, set by the government but
reflecting a normal market rate of return on, say, medium-term government
bonds.
30 Since the allowance would approximate normal profits, its deduction
from total taxable profits means that the CT would be confined to pure profits
from intramarginal investments.
                                                                                                                                   
partial dividend deduction system is equivalent to the split-rate method — part of the German imputation
system.
28 An interesting aspect of the US Treasury Department dividend deduction proposal (see footnote 27) was that
the automatic extension of the benefit to non-residents was seen to be positive, because it would help finance
the US deficit on current account. (Mentioned by Charles McLure in his comments on a draft of this article.)
29 Andrews (1979 and 1989), reporting for the American Law Institute, has proposed a limited deduction
(determined by applying a risk-free rate of interest) for dividends on new equity, as well as a corporate excise
tax on redemptions. Warren (1981 and 1993), however, has argued that the proposal would not be feasible.
30 Bond and Devereux (1995) have shown that the rate of relief for the ACE allowance should be the risk-free
rate, provided that taxable profits and losses are treated symmetrically and that the tax rate is a known constant.Fiscal Studies
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Proponents of the ACE allowance (Devereux and Freeman, 1991; Gammie,
1992b) point out that in present value terms its tax base is identical to the base of
an annual pure profits tax, for two reasons. First, the equity allowance permits
any schedule of depreciation allowances without altering the present value of the
tax payments associated with the cash flow of an investment. High depreciation
allowances result in a lower amount of shareholders’ funds and hence a lower
allowance, and vice versa. Second, both companies and shareholders can borrow
at the appropriate nominal interest rate to offset different profiles of tax
payments or distributions, respectively. Furthermore, the ACE allowance
preserves neutrality under inflation, because the interest rate is set at its full
nominal level.
A form of ACE allowance has been adopted in Croatia where it is called the
Interest Adjusted Income Tax (IAIT) (Rose and Wiswesser, forthcoming). Under
the IAIT, companies that keep proper accounts are permitted to deduct an
imputed normal return, called `protective interest’ (equal to the rate of growth of
manufacturing prices plus 3 percentage points), on their equity from taxable
profits as conventionally computed. The self-employed, who may not have
proper accounts, are permitted to deduct a similar return, which, however, is
calculated by reference to the book value of depreciable assets. Savings of
individual taxpayers are included in the tax base, but the normal return on them
is exempt (prepayment method). Pension contributions, on the other hand, are
deductible from taxable income, while payouts are taxed (standard method). The
IAIT was implemented on 1 January 1994. Reports on the Croatian experience
are not in yet.
Undoubtedly, the ACE allowance has attractive neutrality properties. The
neutrality conditions, however, are met only if capital markets are perfect. If
dividends continued to be taxed under present PTs, the ACE system would
favour retentions even more strongly over distributions than do the current
systems. To be fully neutral, the ACE allowance requires the reform of the PT,
along the lines of an extended personal equity plan (IFS Capital Taxes Group,
1989) or the IAIT in Croatia. But the move to a full expenditure tax would
fundamentally change the debate and greatly complicate the reform.
31 Under
current PT taxing arrangements, the ACE allowance would erode the source
entitlement principle — resembling the erosion of the residence principle due to
interest deductibility. The ACE allowance might be given consideration if
express or tacit co-ordination on taxing capital income cannot be achieved yet
the existing bias against equity is a serious problem.
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5. Cash-Flow Tax
Usually, a tax on the pure profits of an investment is associated with cash-flow
taxation. As has been shown in the literature (Meade Committee, 1978), a tax on
the flow of funds into and out of any investment is equivalent in present value
terms to an annual pure profits tax levied over the lifetime of the investment.
Under the cash-flow tax, companies would be denied a deduction for interest as
well as dividends paid (if not already denied), but they would be allowed an
immediate write-off of the cost of business assets. As a result, only pure profits
or rent income would be taxed, not normal profits. In particular, the return on
marginal investments, just making a viable economic return, would be exempted.
Again, full neutrality, generally, cannot be achieved if, at the same time, current
PTs are not replaced by personal consumption taxes, under which all savings or,
alternatively, the yield of all savings are exempted from PT.
32
Full neutrality is also achieved under the cash-flow-equivalent, subtraction-
VAT type of origin-based direct tax, which has been proposed in the US (Hall
and Rabushka, 1995) in replacement of the current personal and company
income taxes. Under the `flat tax’, value added, consisting of wages and capital
income, is determined by deducting purchases (including investment goods)
from sales. Subsequently, wages are deducted and taxed separately at the
individual level, permitting a basic exemption (and effective progressivity).
Remaining capital income is taxed at the flat rate without basic exemption.
Again, pure profits would be taxed, but the return on intramarginal investments
would be exempted. For the time being, it seems unlikely that the US will
introduce a flat tax. Apart from the fear of the unknown, transitional difficulties
and international problems (for example, obtaining a foreign tax credit for it)
seem to preclude its adoption.
33
6. Comprehensive Business Income Tax
34
The dividend deduction system and the ACE allowance (without a personal
expenditure tax complement) continue to favour retained profits over dividends
and interest, and exempt entities and foreign shareholders and debtholders over
domestic holders. A cash-flow tax, on the other hand, would be costly upfront to
revenue (the immediate write-offs generally would call for rebates and positive
                                                                                                                                   
32 The combination of a cash-flow CT and a traditional PT would yield neutrality towards company financing
decisions only if the marginal PT rates on interest, dividends and accrued capital gains on shares were
identical. See OECD (1991, p. 32).
33 See McLure and Zodrow (1996) for arguments why taxation based on cash flow has administrative and
economic advantages over a conventional income tax. For a discussion of implementation problems, see Mintz
and Seade (1991) and Shome and Schutte (1993).
34 See the detailed treatment in US Department of the Treasury (1992, ch. 3). For reviews of the US Treasury
study, see Goode (1992) and Sunley (1992).Fiscal Studies
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tax payments would be delayed) and out of step with conventional concepts of
determining profits. In view of these drawbacks, perhaps the focus should be on
a more even-handed taxation of profits, conventionally computed, and interest at
company level. Taxation at company level would keep the tax intact on normal
profits as well as corporate earnings paid to tax-exempt and foreign
shareholders, i.e. shore up the source entitlement principle.
On the basis of this philosophy, the comprehensive business income tax
(CBIT), proposed by the US Department of the Treasury (1992), taxes all
company earnings at company level. The CBIT proceeds from the fundamental
equivalence between a CT levied at source and an equal-rate PT on company
earnings with full credit for the underlying CT. Accordingly, under the CBIT,
CT and PT are integrated by not allowing deductions, at company level, for
dividends and interest paid to shareholders and debtholders, and not taxing these
income items at the level of the recipients, be they individuals or companies.
This makes the debt-equity distinction irrelevant, and greatly reduces the
distinction between retained and distributed earnings (depending on the
treatment of capital gains). Extending the CBIT to proprietorships and
partnerships — more difficult to achieve — would also make the distinction
between companies and non-companies irrelevant for tax purposes.
The CBIT can be introduced while largely maintaining the present rules for
determining taxable profits, including those applicable to depreciation and
inventory accounting. Exempt entities and non-residents would be treated like
resident individuals or companies. They would not be eligible for a refund of the
CBIT, nor would they have to pay any additional CBIT in the form of a
withholding tax or otherwise. Companies receiving CBIT income also would not
be taxable on such income. To ensure that dividends and interest are not paid out
of exempt earnings, a compensatory tax (already in place under various
imputation systems in the EU) should be levied on exempt income (made
available for distribution as dividends or interest).
35 Capital gains on shares
would only be taxed to the extent that they exceed the acquisition cost stepped
up by the company’s retained profits net of the CT.
The CBIT, as proposed, would reduce the relative tax burden on new equity-
financed investment and increase the burden on debt-financed investment.
Established firms and institutional investors would face a relatively higher tax
burden, as would tax haven countries, but new, growing firms would be taxed
less heavily. The CBIT would eliminate the incentives for thin capitalisation and
the bias against profit distributions. The exemption of dividend income at
shareholder level and the taxation of interest at source should reduce the need for
concerted tax co-ordination at the central EU level. In other words, operational
                                                                                                                                   
35 The US Department of the Treasury (1992) advocates also imposing the compensatory tax on foreign source
income, while retaining current foreign tax credit rules. To avoid double taxation, this should not, of course, be
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independence would be promoted, although substantial non-subsidiarity (co-
operation) is required to get there, especially as regards interest on inward debt
investment (Gammie, 1992c). To alleviate the effects on current debt-equity
structures, the CBIT could be introduced gradually. The US Department of the
Treasury (1992), for instance, proposes a 10-year phase-in period. Initially, say,
10 per cent of interest payments would be disallowed, while dividend income
would be taxed on a schedular basis at a rate that would be reduced over time.
7. Dual Income Tax
The CBIT could function properly in the US, where the CT rate does not differ
much from (or is equal to) the top PT rate. The situation in the EU, however, is
markedly different. While most CT rates do not exceed the US CT rate, PT rates
in the EU are considerably higher than EU CT rates, as well as the US PT rate. If
it is not possible to reduce PT rates on all income, other approaches to CT
reform must be explored.
An imaginative solution to the problems posed by the CT/top-PT differential
has been found by the Nordic countries.
36 Denmark and Sweden, but especially
Finland and Norway, have transformed their CTs and PTs into dual income
taxes, under which capital income is treated separately for tax purposes from
labour income (see Table 2).
37 To limit possibilities for tax arbitrage and to deal
with growing capital mobility, all capital income, conventionally ascertained, is
taxed once, no more and no less, at a uniform, flat rate, i.e. the CT rate, while
labour income continues to be taxed at progressive rates. Full imputation, as in
Finland and Norway, ensures that distributed profits are always subject to CT or
PT. Capital gains are taxed in a similar fashion to that under the CBIT. Capital
income accruing in proprietorships and closed companies is determined as the
product of equity for tax purposes and a presumptive rate of return; remaining
`profits’ are taxed as labour income.
38To limit opportunities for tax arbitrage, the
CT rate equals the lowest PT rate on labour income. In the course of the reforms,
labour and capital income tax rates were substantially reduced (see Table 2),
although revenue increased.
39
The Nordic countries noted that the lower flat tax on capital income would
mitigate the lock-in effect of a capital gains tax that induces capital owners to
                                                                                                                                   
36 See the surveys and evaluations by Lodin (1993) and Sørensen (1994a).
37 For individual country reviews, see Pedersen (1993) for Denmark, Tikka (1993) for Finland, Skaar (1991)
for Norway and Grosskopf (1990), Mutén (1992) and Andersson and Mutén (1994) for Sweden. For an outline
of a Dutch dual income tax aimed at reducing the wedge on labour income and eliminating the highly
differentiated taxation of capital income, see Cnossen (1995).
38 For a good treatment of the issues, see Hagen and Sørensen (1996).
39 CT and PT receipts from capital income increased, e.g. in Sweden by 2.7 percentage points of GDP; at the
same time, the highly distortionary tax burden on labour income was reduced — by 5.6 percentage points of
GDP over a period of three years. See OECD (1994, Table 3) in conjunction with Swedish Ministry of Finance
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postpone realisation, thereby frustrating the workings of the capital market.
Furthermore, a lower rate eases the effects of applying the tax to inflationary
gains, which should not be taxed but for which it is difficult to correct on
practical grounds.
40 It has also been pointed out (Sørensen, 1994a) that
horizontal equity implies that capital income should be taxed lower than labour
income. After all, on the assumption of equal income-earning capacities, a global
income tax that taxes savings twice weighs more heavily on people who save or
who enter the labour market early than on people who consume their income
early or start working later in life. In this situation, a lower tax rate on capital
income lessens the horizontal discrimination between taxpayers with different
patterns of consumption or different earnings profiles.
a inclusive of local taxes
b Effective 1 January 1995, tax rates on labour income were increased to 32-56 per cent, whilst the company
profits rate was reduced to 28 per cent. Furthermore, the double tax on dividends was reinstated and the
reduced rate on capital gains was abolished.
c In 1995, the CT rate was increased to 28 per cent.
d The highest marginal rate on capital income less than Dkr 20,000 (Dkr 40,000 for married couples) cannot
exceed 44 per cent.
Source: Sørensen, 1994a, p. 59.
                                                                                                                                   
40 To illustrate, if the nominal return on an asset is 10 per cent and the rate of inflation is 4 per cent, then a PT
rate of 50 per cent must be reduced to 30 per cent [0.5(0.1 - 0.04)/0.1] if only the real return is to be taxed.Company Taxes in the EU
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The treatment of capital income under the dual income tax strongly resembles
its treatment under the CBIT, and effects should be similar. Labour income,
however, is subject to higher (progressive) tax rates and capital income is taxed
at a flat rate. Furthermore, interest is taxed at the level of the recipient instead of
at company level. A non-refundable withholding tax on interest, set at the level
of the CT rate as in Finland, would make the treatment of capital income paid to
resident PT- or CT-liable individuals or investors identical to its treatment under
the CBIT. A very important difference with the CBIT is that the Nordic countries
do not tax interest on the source basis. (Withholding tax rates on interest paid on
inward debt investment are nil.) To do so would require extensive discussion




In terms of the neutrality and subsidiarity criteria developed in Section III —
equality of effective CT+PT rates on various forms of company earnings,
regardless of the tax status of the recipients — full integration, dual imputation
and dividend deduction do not seem to be serious prototypes for co-ordinating
the CTs in the EU. All of these prototypes place undue reliance on the residence
principle for taxing the full return on capital. It does not seem that this principle
could be adequately implemented in a world of greatly increased capital mobility
and financial innovation, offering a multitude of opportunities for domestic and
cross-border tax arbitrage.
Without a personal expenditure tax complement, the ACE allowance and the
cash-flow tax similarly rely on the residence principle in taxing the normal return
on equity at the individual level. In view of the opportunities for cross-border
arbitrage, this implies giving up on the effective taxation of normal profits, as
has de facto been done with the taxation of interest. A personal expenditure tax
complement would sanction the exemption of normal (and pure) profits and
interest at company and individual level. But again, opportunities for tax
arbitrage and evasion raise doubt as to whether the consumption of these returns
would ever be taxed.
More importantly, the body politic in the EU (and the US) thus far seems to
favour the taxation of the normal return to capital. The CT is looked upon as a
progressive element in most tax systems and an essential complement to the PT.
There appears to be no compelling reason, moreover, to eliminate the CT (and
                                                                                                                                   
41 As Malcolm Gammie pointed out to me, international debt markets generally operate on a gross interest
payment basis and most existing loan instruments have gross-up clauses and clauses permitting early
repayment if the taxation basis for interest changes. These clauses would be likely to be triggered, however low
a withholding tax on interest were introduced (or increased).Fiscal Studies
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other taxes on capital income) on efficiency grounds.
42 If so, the remaining
contenders for the present CTs are the CBIT and the dual income tax. To meet
the neutrality and subsidiarity criteria, however, the dual income tax, like the
CBIT, would have to be levied in full on the source basis.
43 This can be achieved
through the imposition of a withholding tax on interest at company level, which
would not be rebatable to exempt entities and non-residents.
Unlike the CBIT, the dual income tax continues to tax labour income at
progressive rates over and above the proportional rate applicable to capital (and
labour) income. Most EU member states may wish to do so, for two reasons.
First, they have a preference for a fairly large public sector; in other words, the
demand for revenue is large. Relatively immobile tax bases, such as labour, will
then have to be exploited more intensively than in, for example, the US. Second,
separate taxation of labour and capital income leaves open the option of
lowering the tax rate on capital income further (without, at the same time, having
to lower the rate on labour income), should capital become even more mobile
than it is at present. A vertical equity argument for higher taxes on labour
income, moreover, is that most income differences in modern economies seem to
be due more to differences in human capital than to differences in financial
capital. Furthermore, efficiency considerations support progressive taxes on
labour income, because they may moderate wage demands in unionised countries
(Lockwood and Manning, 1993).
The dual income tax seems more or less in line with conventional methods of
ascertaining profits or income, and existing forms of CT/PT systems. Six
member states already have an imputation system. This system, or an equivalent
compensatory tax, would also have to be introduced by the other member states
upon the adoption of an EU-wide dual income tax. All states would have to deny
the imputation credit to out-of-state shareholders and exempt entities. Another
six member states already tax company profits, whether retained or distributed,
at flat rates; they would have to eliminate the special PT rate on dividend
income. All but four member states already apply a withholding tax to interest
payments. This withholding tax would have to be introduced by all member
states, but exemptions or tax refunds for non-residents and exempt entities would
have to be abolished. Moreover, nearly all member states (Finland is the
exception) should align the taxation of all forms of capital income with their CT
rates. Finally, residence countries should exempt out-of-state dividend, interest
and royalty income.
                                                                                                                                   
42 On the efficiency costs of the CT and its effect on the distribution of the tax burden, see Gravelle (1994,
especially ch. 2).
43 Source taxation increases the importance of properly defining the source of income. Formula-based taxation
to determine the source of income of companies operating throughout the EU would be a much more far-
reaching alternative. See McLure (1989) and Weiner (1992). Formula-based taxation, however, would require
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Under the dual income tax, all equity and debt income earned by companies
is taxed only once: at shareholder and debtholder level through imputation
(dividends) and withholding (interest, royalties) techniques. Also, such income
would be taxed only by the source state. As a point of immediate policy
relevance, this suggests that the parent-subsidiary directive (no source dividend
tax on intercompany profit distributions) should be welcomed, but that the draft
interest-royalty directive (no source tax on interest and royalties) should not be
adopted. After all, the parent-subsidiary directive eliminates an undesirable extra
layer of tax, but the draft interest-royalty directive prohibits a desired single
layer of tax.
The proportional, in rem taxation of all company earnings would obviate the
need for thin capitalisation rules. Also, the lack of external neutrality of current
imputation systems would be a matter of the past. Tax credits would not be
extended to out-of-state shareholders, because the proportional rate in source
states and the exemption of capital income in domicile states would
approximately ensure non- discriminatory treatment. Manipulation of transfer
prices (prices charged to foreign affiliated companies) would still be possible to
influence the allocation of profits (and thus CT revenues) between the member
states, but a minimum CT rate, as proposed by the Ruding Committee, should
reduce the incentive for this form of tax arbitrage (Daly and Weiner, 1993). In
this connection, it should be emphasised that approximation of statutory tax rates
seems more important than approximation of effective tax rates. Differences in
statutory rates are important for exploiting opportunities for tax avoidance
(transfer pricing, thin capitalisation). Effective tax rates, on the other hand, have
regard to the ascertainment of taxable profits (depreciation, inventory valuation)
with respect to less mobile physical capital. Tolerable differences in effective tax
rates would increase the operational independence of the member states.
The dual income tax would reduce the cost of equity-financed investment and
increase the cost of debt-financed investment. This should benefit new, starting
enterprises. The lower cost (and therefore the higher relative return) of equity
should promote shareholding, make mergers (to avoid the double tax on
dividends) less attractive, induce pension funds to change the composition of
their portfolios in favour of shares, and form a natural barrier against easy
foreign acquisition of domestic firms. In short, the dynamics of the market would
be strengthened and ownership patterns would more closely reflect underlying
market forces. Finally, the dual income tax should reduce the need for taxing
capital gains on substantial shareholdings, because the profit of closely-held
companies is split into a capital and a labour component with annual taxation of
the proceeds from employment performed by management. This should improve
the workings of the capital market, because profits of closely-held companies
can be distributed without incurring tax.
Phase-in issues should be given due attention. Although the more effective
taxation of interest income is clearly a goal worth pursuing, gradual andFiscal Studies
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concerted action is called for. Caution is advisable because the current tax-
induced changes in corporate financing patterns may to a large extent serve to
reduce the distortions of real investment and saving decisions. Higher before-tax
interest rates, moreover, would dampen (debt-financed) investment demand. Co-
ordination with the US and Japan would be essential in order to prevent tax-
induced capital outflows from reducing the post-tax return to saving or instead
raising the cost of capital in the EU, and to jointly constrain tax haven
practices.
44 A start could be made with a common minimum EU withholding
rate. Interest paid to out-of-state residents should be included in the base. The
low level of the rate would minimise changes in the interstate distribution of tax
revenues. Additional revenues, moreover, would be likely to be positive for all
member states in view of the present arrangements, which closely resemble the
proverbial sieve.
This article has argued that domestic and cross-border investment decisions
in the EU are distorted by a crazy quilt of widely diverging tax rates on company
earnings (and other capital income). Tax neutrality, an important leitmotif in the
Treaty of Rome, requires a more even-handed approach to the taxation of
retained profits, distributions and interest, as well as capital gains, royalties and
other forms of capital income. Current dividend relief systems repair only a
minor defect (of doubtful pain for mature companies) of classical CT/PT systems
and greatly complicate the treatment of outward and inward dividend income.
More importantly, the deductibility of interest at company level, in conjunction
with the existence of capital-rich exempt domestic and foreign sectors, creates an
enormous loophole in the CT and greatly distorts the debt-equity choice.
Tax subsidiarity, an important leading thought in the Treaty of Maastricht,
requires agreement on the allocation of tax bases throughout the EU and on the
basic structure of the instruments for tapping those bases. The allocation of the
CT base should probably be based on the primacy of the source entitlement
principle, extended to all company earnings — profits as well as interest and
royalties. A CT structure, agreed upon along these lines, would permit
substantial operational independence; in other words, the need for day-to-day co-
ordination would be minimised. The EU VAT is a good example of the way in
which these distinct but related dimensions of subsidiarity have been effected.
The Sixth Directive provides for a common VAT structure, yet member states
enjoy nearly full independence in operating their VATs. Perhaps the CTs in the
EU should be co-ordinated in similar fashion.
                                                                                                                                   
44 The prospects of international co-ordination are not as bleak as they seem to be at first sight. The US, for
instance, has already debated the merits of the CBIT, which closely resembles the dual income tax.Company Taxes in the EU
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